Barton Child Law and Policy Clinic Policy Paper
2001 Georgia Children's Agenda Item:
Strengthen Georgia's Child Protective Services' Capacity to Protect Children From Abuse and Neglect
II. RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)
- Establish an integrated statewide information system for
the confidential tracking of children who have been the subject
of abuse or neglect allegations.
An important state goal for FY2001 is to develop a computer system for tracking every child abuse report that comes to DFCS as well as the placement and case status of every child in our state's foster care system. Numerous attempts to build such a system in Georgia have failed. We know that Georgia has built computer systems to track many other things such as motor vehicle licenses and tax bills, so why is it that the state cannot develop a system to track abused and neglected children? The reasons are complicated. Past attempts appear to have failed due to politics, faulty contracts, and a lack of willingness at the state level to make building an effective computer system a priority.
The Federal Government -- SACWIS
The Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System (SACWIS) was authorized by Congress in 1993 to help states meet the data collection and reporting obligations for abused and neglected children required under the Social Security Act. For states that follow federal guidelines in developing computerized tracking and data collection systems, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reimburses the state for 50% to 75% of the development and implementation costs. Georgia has attempted to build a system according to federal guidelines approximately four times.36 Georgia is not alone in its failures. According to the federal SACWIS website, only 25 states have SACWIS systems that are "operational."37
A critical question is why, when the federal government has offered to pay up to 75% of the cost of a system since 1993, have only half of the states been able to build one. Georgia started building a system in 1991-92 called ServiceNet before the SACWIS legislation passed. ServiceNet was functional in fifteen counties. The state eliminated funding to the project after the federal legislation upped the ante by adding the prospect of many more dollars to build the system. Ironically, the federal government's offer may have contributed to Georgia's failure. The virtually unlimited budget attracted the attention of powerful technology vendor groups. Because these systems are so large and so costly, the federal government stipulates detailed planning, contractual, and project management procedures, setting a very high bar for the states.
The Request for Proposals -- The RFP
In theory, everyone with the necessary expertise and capabilities should have an equal opportunity to make a proposal to the state for building a SACWIS system. The request for proposal (RFP) process has evolved over many years, driven largely by defense and traditional construction projects. The traditional RFP has not been shown to be appropriate in the construction of very large information systems.
Thus far, Georgia has attempted to purchase its SACWIS system using a single, very large RFP. This approach has been driven by the federal requirement that the SACWIS Advanced Planning Document plan for a "full implementation of a comprehensive system."38 In traditional construction projects, a full implementation plan is desirable for cost containment, limiting project scope, and time management. However, in computer projects it is common for major technologies to be obsolete in the space of a year. Georgia's SACWIS RFP cycles have taken about two years from the time of writing the RFP to awarding the contract. Additionally, SACWIS proposals to date have required bidders to put up a $500,000 performance bond, effectively eliminating the medium and small size, fast-moving, innovative companies, and limiting the competition to the large consulting firms (e.g. Andersen, Deloitte, KPMG, EDS, etc.). Add to this the threat of high-stakes lawsuits if the process is not "fair enough" and the RFP process may seem doomed to failure.
The private sector faces similar challenges in the fast-changing technology markets. There, it has become common practice to use a "phased approach" to the bidding and the building of large systems. The federal government allows for such an approach, but, due to our record of failed RFP's, that flexibility may be denied to Georgia.39
Our State Government
Frequent leadership changes in DHR over the last decade have hampered all large technology projects.40 The lack of a state Chief Information Officer (CIO) with the resources to formulate intelligent standards and the power to enforce them has produced the fragile, fractured infrastructure on which our state's information systems now rest. In this leadership vacuum, county and state managers have done what they had to do to meet their obligations -- they have built a variety of "interim" information systems. The under-compensated ($10,000-$30,000 below market) information technology staff at the state has attempted to specify, bid out, and manage multi-million dollar projects. In the case of the SACWIS system the result has been over $30,000,000 expended with little or nothing to show for it and a record of failures that the federal government will not soon forget.41
The child protection and foster care sections of DFCS rely primarily on two existing reporting systems: the Protective Services Data System (PSDS) and the Internal Data System (IDS). PSDS records reports of child maltreatment for all DFCS county offices. IDS is a centralized, web-based reporting system that grew from the ServiceNet systems. Each county arranges its own contract with the vendor that owns IDS. IDS allows Georgia to meet federal reporting requirements and draw federal funds for children through title IV-E of the Social Security Act. IDS cannot be used for tracking or case-management.
Hope for the Future
On, July 1, 2000, Governor Barnes established the Georgia Technology Authority with Georgia's first state CIO, Larry Singer.42 Prior to taking this position, Mr. Singer founded a non-profit technology consulting firm focused on helping states build human services systems, including SACWIS.43 Mr. Singer is familiar with the history of SACWIS, the mistakes of other states, and the federal rules and requirements. He has a mandate from Governor Barnes to build a SACWIS compliant system. The current leadership at DHR has also expressed their commitment to SACWIS as a top priority. Mr. Singer plans to have the first phase of a SACWIS system ready for RFP by May, 2002. His progress will be followed with great interest.44
36 Georgia's most recent version of SACWIS was called FACETs.
37 DHHS - Administration for Children & Families, Office of State Systems website (updated Oct. 24, 2000, visited Jan. 16, 2001) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/oss/sacwis/cwsstat.htm>.
38 Automation of Child Welfare Programs -- Transmittal No. ACF-OISM-001 (updated Oct. 14, 1997, visited Feb. 6, 2001) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/oss/sacwis/sacwisat.htm>.
39 Id.
40 See infra p. 17.
41 Ron Martz, Child welfare computer plan may face crash, Atlanta Journal Constitution, October 27, 2000.
42 Georgia Technology Authority Website (visited Jan. 16, 2001) <http://gagta.org/>.
43 Public Interest Breakthroughs, Inc. Website (visited Jan. 16, 2001) <http://www.p-i-b.org/>. See also Dick Pettys, Georgia's new chief geek aims to improve government with technology, Associated Press, September 11, 2000.
44 Interviews by Andrew and Michelle Barclay with Mr. Singer (Feb. 2, 2001 and Nov. 20, 2000).
Table of Contents: I. Introduction - II. Recommendations - III. Tools for Systemic Change - IV. Conclusions.
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